The euro zone's debt crisis

by Biodun Iginla, Senior News and Finacial Analyst, BBC News and the Economist

Panic about the Greek government’s ability to repay its creditors is infecting other euro-area countries’ sovereign debt. Where will it end?

Apr 29th 2010 | From The Economist print edition

AFTER simmering for months, the Greek sovereign-debt crisis has boiled over. The promise of a rescue by the IMF and the country’s euro-zone partners, worth €45 billion ($60 billion) or more, is no longer enough to persuade many private investors to hold Greek public bonds. Opposition to the bail-out in Germany meant that market confidence had all but vanished by April 27th, when Standard and Poor’s (S&P) slashed its rating of Greek government bonds to BB+, just below investment grade. The rating agency also lowered its rating on Portugal, to A-; a day later it downgraded Spain from AA+ to AA.

In keeping with its practice when rating bonds as junk, S&P gave an estimate of the likely “recovery rate” should the worst happen. It said bondholders were likely to get back only 30-50% of their principal were Greece to restructure its debt or to default. That prompted panic in bond markets. The yield on Greece’s ten-year bonds leapt above 11% and that on two-year bonds to almost 19% at one point on April 28th. Portugal’s borrowing rates jumped, too (see chart 1). At those rates, the racier sort of hedge fund might still be prepared to gamble on Greece paying back its debts at face value, but mainstream funds are abandoning the bonds in their droves. The speculators blamed by officials for precipitating the crisis may now be the only people willing to take a punt on Greece.

Had the rescue been swift and squabble-free, there was a chance, albeit slim, that private investors might have rolled over their existing holdings of Greek debt at tolerable interest rates. That Greece’s would-be rescuers may not after all stump up the money they promised is one of the risks that bondholders are loth to bear—though Germany may now approve its share of the bail-out by May 7th (see article). Another is that Greece will not be able to stomach the programme of budgetary and economic reform which the IMF is due to set out in early May, and on which the euro-zone rescue funds will depend.

A third concern is that even if the programme runs smoothly, the debts that Greece will continue to rack up will be too great for its feeble economy to bear. Earlier analysis by The Economist suggested that Greek government debt would rise to 149% of GDP by 2014 even if its deficit reduction went well. It assumes that Greece could sustain a brutal reduction in its primary budget deficit (ie, excluding interest costs) of 12 percentage points. Even that relied on an interest rate of 5%, roughly what euro-zone partners have agreed they will levy on Greece, on all new borrowing and on maturing debt. If interest costs are much higher, the government will have to find extra savings elsewhere. The deep cuts will only prolong Greece’s recession. Wages will have to fall if the country is to regain the cost competitiveness needed for a recovery. Both influences will push down nominal GDP for a while and make crisis management all the more difficult.

The scale of the task and the bungling of the rescue make the bond market’s capitulation seem natural. Greece needs so much money that the only thing standing between the country and default is open-ended funding from the IMF and the rest of the euro area. The €45 billion fund announced on April 11th would be enough to cover Greece’s budget deficit and repay its maturing debts (including the €8.5 billion that falls due on May 19th) for the rest of 2010. But Greece may need as much again in 2011 and still more thereafter. In an average year, Greece has to refinance around €40 billion of its debt (this year, would you believe, is a mercifully light one for redemptions). Add to that the €70 billion or so of fresh borrowing that may be needed to cover Greece’s cumulative budget deficits until 2014 and the scale of a credible rescue fund becomes clear.

Yet Greece’s would-be rescuers may feel they have little choice but to press on with the bail-out. A default that would cut the value of Greek public debt by a half or more would cripple the country’s banks. (S&P has also downgraded four of them to junk status.) It would also spark a wider financial panic in Europe. Around €213 billion-worth of Greek government bonds are held abroad. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) estimates that foreign banks’ lending to Greece’s government, banks and private sector was €164 billion at the end of last year. How much of this is public debt is unclear. But if half of the foreign holdings of government bonds are held by banks, and if each country’s banks owns those bonds in proportion to their total holdings of Greek assets, then perhaps €76 billion is held by euro-zone banks (see table 2).

Euro-zone countries might be tempted to let Greece default, force non-bank investors to take a hit, and use the funds earmarked to rescue Greece to fortify their banks instead. That would cost perhaps €53 billion if, as S&P fears, a restructuring of Greek debt resulted in losses of as much as 70%. That may look small next to a rescue fund. But if Greece defaulted it would still rely on its EU partners to fund its budget deficit, which will take time to shrink from the 13.6% of GDP it reached last year. It seems there are no longer any options for Greece that will not cost its partners a lot.

The risk of contagion

Other countries may now need a helping hand, too. The hope that Greece’s problems could be contained now seems faint. There is growing anxiety about the poor state of public finances in Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain. Each has some combination of big budget deficits and high public debt, though none is as financially stretched as Greece. But their deeper problem stems from a decade when wage growth ran far ahead of productivity gains. Stuck in the euro, they can no longer cure that malady by devaluation. The only remedies are a period of wage restraint combined with structural reforms aimed at boosting productivity. These will take time, as well as political will, to put in place. The danger is that restless bond investors will not wait.

Portugal is first in the markets’ sights. Its ten-year bond yield rose to 5.7% on April 28th, the highest for more than a decade, in the wake of the S&P downgrades and the anxiety about the size and timing of the Greek bail-out. A week earlier its yields were below 5%. Portugal could be forgiven for feeling picked on. Although its budget deficit last year was an alarming 9.3% of GDP, that was lower than Greece’s. Its public debt, at 77% of GDP last year, is less scary too. That is, in part, the result of a programme to slash the deficit in the years before the global financial crisis struck, and gives Portugal’s government a credibility that Greece lacks. On April 28th its prime minister, José Sócrates, said he and the opposition had reached agreement on speeding up an austerity programme.

Yet Portugal shares three weaknesses with Greece. First, its economy is small (smaller, indeed, than Greece’s), accounting for 2% of euro-area GDP. It offers investors very little diversification. Those who want safe claims in euros can simply lend to Germany or France, and save themselves any worries about Portugal’s economy and public finances.

A second weakness is competitiveness. Greece at least had a boom after it joined the euro in 2001. Portugal seemed to exhaust the benefits of the euro before the currency was born. It grew healthily in the late 1990s as its interest rates fell to converge on Germany’s in the run-up to the euro’s creation. But it has never recovered convincingly from the downturn that followed. GDP grew by an annual average of less than 1% between 2001 and 2008; productivity growth was weak. Nominal wage growth of 3% a year further undermined competitiveness.

Portugal has got by on a drip-feed of foreign capital. Its current-account deficit averaged 9% of GDP in 2001-08. The cumulative impact of those deficits is behind the third weakness it shares with Greece: the foreign debts that its firms, households and government have run up. The IMF reckons that Portugal’s net international debt (what residents owe to foreigners, less the foreign assets they own) was 96% of GDP in 2008, an even higher ratio than Greece’s (see chart 3).

A good chunk of the gross debt is held by foreign banks: The BIS puts the figure at €198 billion at the end of last year, around 120% of GDP (see table 4). The bulk of this has been borrowed by homeowners and businesses. The debt has to be rolled over from time to time, which makes Portugal, like Greece, vulnerable to a sudden change in sentiment. As with Greece, the bulk of public debt is held abroad and the country’s low saving rate means it too depends on foreign buyers of fresh debt.

Could contagion spread further? Spain looks most at risk. Its dependence on foreign finance is on a par with Greece’s. Spain’s public-debt burden, at 53% of GDP last year, means its fiscal position is among the least worrying of all rich countries’ (though an eye-watering deficit means that burden is rising fast). The country’s biggest task is to convince foreign investors that its economy will revive without further infusions of credit. Though Italy has a big public-debt burden, it can hope to rely on domestic savers to buy its government bonds. Its net foreign debts and current-account deficit are fairly small by rich-country standards. Much of the Irish assets held by foreigners are factories and offices, rather than bonds and loans, so Ireland is less prone to a sudden stop of overseas finance. It also has a good record of putting its public finances right.

Do the rumblings in Greece signal a wider retreat by investors from sovereign debt? Defensive Eurocrats point out that the public finances of the euro area as a whole are no worse than America’s. The IMF reckons that America’s net public debt will be 70% of GDP this year, against a euro-zone average of 68%. But the zone is not a single fiscal entity and investors are wary of countries whose finances or growth prospects are worse than average.

America has the great advantage of issuing the world’s reserve currency. In crises, scared investors rush into American Treasuries, which are prized for their liquidity. That is why Treasury yields fell this week as Greece’s soared. That hunger for American assets has lifted the dollar against the euro (and the yen, sterling and the Swiss franc) since the start of the year. That at least is some comfort for members of the euro zone. When countries accounting for more than a third of its GDP are struggling in export markets, that is exactly what they need.

Posted by biginla at 7:45 PM BST

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Germany and Greece

by Biodun Iginla and Natalie de Vallieres

The prospect of a bail-out is causing resentment in both Germany and Greece

Apr 29th 2010 | ATHENS AND BERLIN | From The Economist print edition

A message from Athens

ANGELA MERKEL’S political credibility has not yet been downgraded to junk status, but the past few days have done it no good at all. A few weeks ago the German chancellor was basking in plaudits for taking a hard line against a European bail-out of Greece. That was before George Papandreou, the Greek prime minister, bowed to the inevitable on April 23rd and asked for the €30 billion ($40 billion) loan pledged by Greece’s euro-zone partners, of which Germany’s share is about €8 billion. A further slice, of perhaps €15 billion, may come from the IMF.

Now Mrs Merkel is under fire both from those who had praised her and from those who now blame her for dragging out the rescue, further destabilising financial markets and raising the ultimate cost of the bail-out. Reported politicians’ estimates of the whole bill have soared to €120 billion and far beyond, with a correspondingly greater contribution from Germany.

Many Germans feel they are being forced to choose between two basic principles of their post-war economic order: economic stability and integration within Europe. They gave up the D-mark in 1999 on the understanding that the euro would be equally stable and that German taxpayers would not have to pay for other members’ mistakes. The impending bail-out of Greece—and perhaps later of Portugal and even Spain—would mean the end of that bargain. A Greek bail-out would no doubt face a challenge in Germany’s constitutional court. But to withhold aid would endanger the currency and rattle the banks, some of them German, with billions of euros’ worth of Greek debt on their books.

The crisis could not have come at a politically more awkward moment. On May 9th elections will be held in North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany’s most populous state. There, a coalition of the Christian Democratic Union and the liberal Free Democratic Party, the same alliance that Mrs Merkel leads in Berlin, is fighting an uphill battle to remain in office. A loss would cost her government its majority in the Bundesrat, the upper house of the legislature. But the perception that she is dragging out the process to avoid irritating voters is also damaging her credibility both at home and abroad.

Now the process seems to have shifted into higher gear. On April 28th the chiefs of the IMF and the European Central Bank met German parliamentary leaders in Berlin. The finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, says the government could agree on legislation by May 3rd and get it through the parliament by May 7th. Voters in North Rhine-Westphalia will then decide whether to punish Mrs Merkel.

If Germans resent having to bail out the Greeks, the Greeks dislike the terms on which the rest of the euro zone and the IMF will come to their aid. The official jobless rate has risen to more than 11%, but that fails to take into account many women reluctant to register as unemployed.

Things are about to become more difficult. A three-year reform programme being put together by the IMF, the European Commission and the ECB aims to cut the budget deficit from 13.6% to 2.7% of GDP in just three years, an ambitious target in a shrinking economy. A new pensions law, which is due to be adopted in May, will raise the retirement age for both men and women and reduce the pensions paid by state-controlled corporations. Applications by civil servants to take early retirement under the existing scheme have already jumped by 30%.

The overstaffed public sector will be severely pruned. No one is certain how many jobs will go. But if the programme is rigorously implemented, more than 100,000 Greek public-sector workers will be put out of work by 2013—by a government that came to power promising “more social protection”.

So far, resignation not fury has marked street protests organised by trade unions and the Greek communist party. Fortunately for Mr Papandreou, his Panhellenic Socialist Movement, known as Pasok, dominates both ADEDY, the umbrella public-sector union, and GSEE, its private-sector partner. But the austerity measures the government adopted before the crisis reached boiling point—civil service pay cuts and a hiring freeze—are only just beginning to bite. Infighting in both unions is on the rise; small private-sector unions have already broken ranks and other hardliners are likely to gain ground.

Opinion polls suggest more than 60% of Greeks oppose the government’s decision to call in the fund. The IMF’s reputation for imposing harsh reforms, along with the partial surrender of sovereignty to an American-based institution, seems bound to make Greeks cross. Criticism of Germany, by comparison, is muted.

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Europe's Greek rescue plan

by Natalie de Vallieres, BBC News and the Economist, for the BBC and the Economist's Biodun Iginla

The EU-led aid package is huge—but more will be needed

Apr 11th 2010 | BRUSSELS | From The Economist online

AFTER two months of bluff and bluster, the European Union finally unveiled the details of a financial rescue mechanism for Greece on April 11th. The package was unveiled in an unusual Sunday press conference in Brussels, following a round of telephone conference calls among the governments of the 16 countries that use the single currency. It would offer Greece up to €30 billion ($40 billion) in bilateral loans in the first year, with more available in 2011 and 2012. Interest rates would be set at around 5% for three-year loans, at least to start with. That is a rate about midway between the punitive rates that markets have been demanding from Greece in recent days, and the interest rates being paid by the next weakest members of the euro-zone club, such as Portugal.

The interest rate reflects the need to offer Greece a breathing space from the markets, while mollifying German-led calls to avoid any hint of a “subsidy” for an errant and profligate member of the euro club. When and if (though it is surely a case of when) Greece seeks to activate the mechanism, the loans from the other 15 euro-zone members would be topped up by substantial funds, perhaps amounting to €15 billion, from the International Monetary Fund. The IMF would set its own interest rates and conditions for its loans, the first of which could be available within hours of a Greek request.

Jean-Claude Juncker, the prime minister of Luxembourg, who also chairs the Eurogroup of euro-zone finance ministers, insisted that the mechanism, if activated, would leave intact the “no bail-out” clause in the EU’s treaties, on the grounds that “the loans are repayable and contain no element of subsidy.”

As the largest EU economy, Germany will contribute more than any other country towards a Greek rescue (though German banks also hold large amounts of Greek government debt, and thus would suffer greatly in the event of a default). In these recessionary times, German public opinion is strongly opposed to anything amounting to a handout for Greece, and Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, has duly taken a tough line in advance of important regional elections her coalition must fight on May 9th.

Backed by Austria and the Netherlands, Mrs Merkel repeatedly demanded that Greece be made to pay market rates for any rescue loans (even though such a rescue would only logically be necessary once market rates reached levels Greece could not afford). The German government has also said that the country’s federal constitution outlaws any help that might undermine the strict rules created to ensure the stability of the single currency.

The Brussels announcement amounted to the third and most detailed attempt by EU bosses to sell a tricky message to financial markets and voters alike: that Greece would not be allowed to fall victim to a sovereign credit crunch, but that the euro zone stands by its founding principle that profligate members cannot be bailed out.

EU leaders first pledged in February they would not allow any member of the euro zone to fall victim to a sovereign credit crunch, but failed to explain how they would carry out this promise—as if hoping that their resolve alone would frighten the markets into submission. In March, tense negotiations led by the two largest euro members, France and Germany, generated a second pledge with more details—such as a substantial lending role for the IMF—while still maintaining the polite fiction that a rescue mechanism might never be needed.

As so often before, the Greek finance minister, George Papaconstantinou, told reporters that Greece had not sought help, and hoped to continue borrowing on financial markets. However, his boss George Papandreou, the prime minister, displayed striking candour, telling the Sunday edition of To Vima, a newspaper: “The question remains whether this mechanism will convince markets just like a gun on the table. If it does not convince them, it is a mechanism that it is there to be used.”

Whether it does convince the markets may soon be clear: On April 13th Greece was due to try to auction a fresh slice of short-term debt. The government needs to borrow about €11 billion by the end of May to roll over maturing debt and service interest charges. All in all, the country may need to borrow more than €50 billion in 2010 (estimates vary).

In recent days market anxiety had pushed Greece’s long-term bond yields to their highest levels since the country joined the single currency nearly a decade ago, partly thanks to uncertainty over the EU’s readiness to provide aid. Amid press reports of wealthy clients withdrawing deposits from local banks and sharp falls on the Greek stockmarket, Fitch, a credit-rating agency, downgraded the country’s debt by two notches to BBB-, the lowest investment grade, just above “junk” status. In its announcement on April 9th, Fitch cast doubt on the Greek government’s vow to cut its public deficit by a third—the equivalent of 4% of GDP—this year, in light of the country’s deepening recession and the rising costs of servicing a €300 billion mountain of public debt.

In theory, the rescue mechanism is equipped with a double lock: once Greece has decided it has reached the end of the road with normal market borrowing, officials from the European Central Bank and European Commission must agree that Greece is out of options. In practice, once Greece signals it has lost the confidence of the markets, things will move fast.

Representatives from the commission, the ECB and the Greek government will meet IMF officials on April 12th to discuss the conditions that would be imposed on Greece and the exact size of the IMF contribution. The combined EU-IMF package is a substantial one but few imagine that it will be a one-off: on Sunday Reuters news agency quoted a Greek official as saying the country is likely to need a total €80 billion of loans over three years. If so it will be the largest multilateral rescue of a debt-ridden country yet seen.

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